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REVIEW ARTICLE
WHO ARE THE VICTIMS?*
JAMES 0. FINCKENAUER**
There is currently a controversy raging in the
United States with regard to our correctional system
for dealing with juvenile delinquency and youth
crime. This is not the only controversy concerning
juvenile justice here, but it is one of the more difficult
and sensitive ones. At issue is the nature and extent
of institutional confinement for juvenile offenders. As
is true with most controversial matters, there are
polar extreme positions and a number of intermedi-
ate or moderate views falling somewhere along the
spectrum.
This spectrum might be viewed as an illustration
of Herbert Packer's crime control and due process
models.' The crime control model adapted to juve-
nile justice would advocate institutionalizing most
juvenile criminal offenders for purposes of incapaci-
tation, punishment and deterrence. At the other end
of the spectrum is the due process model, or an adap-
tation described by Katkin, Hyman and Kramer as
the rehabilitative model.2 The latter operates on the
principle that the responsibility of the juvenile jus-
tice system is to ensure a range of comprehensive
treatment programs and strategies which will meet
the rehabilitative needs of individual children. Use
of correctional institutions is de-emphasized, but
where appropriate and necessary, non-punitive re-
habilitative institutions could be used for treatment
purposes.
Several recent developments or trends in thinking
can be viewed in the context of these models. One is
the work of the Juvenile Justice Standards Project of
* A review article of JUVENILE VICTIMIZATION: THE
INSTrrTrIONAL PARADOx. By Clemens Bartollas, Stuart J.
Miller and Simon Dinitz. New York: Sage Publications,
Inc., 1976. Pp. 324. $17.50.
** Rutgers University.
'H. PACKER, THE Liirrs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION
(1968).
2 D. KATIN, D. HYMAN & J. KRAMER, JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY AND THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM (1976).
the American Bar Association Institute of Judicial
Administration. This project recommends moving
away from "the best interests of the youngster" basis
for juvenile court dispositions to sentencing based
upon the seriousness of the crime, the degree of guilt,
and the juvenile's age and prior criminal record.
Specifically recommended is a required sentence of
two years for juveniles who have committed crimes
for which adults normally would be sentenced to
death or to 20 years to life in prison. The recom-
mended minimum sentence for a crime is two
months. In the words of Irving R. Kaufman, Chief
Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit and co-chairman of the joint commis-
sion: " . . young killers, muggers and rapists will
be virtually certain to spend a substantial period of
time in a state facility. Confinement will serve two
goals currently given short shrift: isolation of danger-
ous individuals and deterrence of others."
At another point on the spectrum, perhaps best
personified by Dr. Jerome Miller and his so-called
Massachusetts experiment, is the view that juvenile
correctional institutions are essentially destructive
and unnecessary, and that they can and should be
replaced by a wide array of community programs.
Other juvenile corrections administrators disagree
with this view and argue that it would not be
politically possible to do away with all institutions.
The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention created by the Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 seems to oc-
cupy a middle ground in the controversy. It advo-
cates a reduction in the number of commitments to
juvenile facilities and an increase in the use of non-
secure community-based facilities, and it discour-
ages the use of secure incarceration and detention. It
does not, however, call for a total or even major pro-
gram of deinstitutionalization. In the words of its
administrator, Mr. Milton Luger: "I don't think
community-based programs are a panacea. I don't
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see them as a solution for all offenders. As a matter
of fact, to put the wrong kids in a community pro-
gram destroys both the kids and the program. I
don't have much patience with those who say that
community-based programs are all we need."
What are juvenile correctional institutions like?
Are they as bad as the abolitionists say? What are
their effects upon juvenile offenders confined in
them? Into the debate on these and other critical
questions has come an interesting and informative
book entitled Juvenile Victimization: The Institu-
tional Paradox, by Clemens Bartollas, Stuart J.
Miller and Simon Dinitz. At the very least, this book
should provide some important food for thought. At
best it is a comprehensive evaluation of an example of
juvenile incarceration, an evaluation which can have
a significant impact upon our juvenile justice system.
The major focus of the book is upon juvenile
victimization in a correctional setting. The authors
report, "[W]e examine one institution, which we
believe has its counterparts in almost every state in
the union." That institution is the Training Institu-
tion, Central Ohio (TICO), which houses a max-
imum of 192 boys (142 at the time of the study) and
is the "end-of-the-line" maximum security setting in
Ohio for male juvenile offenders.
The author's definition of victimization is that it
"involves a relationship in which one party loses
material goods, becomes involved involuntarily in
homosexuality, or is involved in any interaction
which causes loss of face without personally satisfy-
ing compensation or restitution." The research ques-
tions which structure the study are: "Does sexual
exploitation constitute the major way in which
victimization takes place? What forms of nonsexual
exploitation occur? What is the extent of sexual/non-
sexual exploitation? What are the characteristics of
exploiters and victims? How do victims contribute to
their victimization? What role does the staff play in
the process of exploitation? And finally, what is the
relationship among organizational, structural, and
personality variables?" The major part of the book
consists of the exploration and description of possible
answers to these questions.
The methodology consisted of staff questionnaires
and interviews, inmate interviews and schedules, and
a review of institutional files. By far the most
valuable method of gaining information seems to
have been the use of a staff member at the institution
as a participant observer. Based upon the staff
questionnaires, the researchers constructed a five-
fold exploitation typology ranging from Exploiters
(made up of "heavies" and their lieutenants who
control the cottages) to Give and Takes, Independ-
ents and Sometimes Boys, to Victims (cottage scape-
goats and a group receiving extensive nonsexual
exploitation). This typology is similar and compara-
ble to Sykes' Society of Captives as a description of
an inmate society.
Bartollas, Miller and Dinitz utilize a number of
quantitative and qualitative methods in their study.
Although they indicate that their research is explora-
tory, issue can be taken with at least several aspects
of their work. One such aspect is the drawing of
conclusions based upon induction, which would more
properly seem to be theories or speculations. This
occurs particularly in the discussion of race and
social class as variables influencing exploitation.
Race and social class are defined as "stimulus
qualities," meaning "characteristics which indicate
to others, consciously or unconsciously, the type of
person a youth is and the likelihood of his being
exploited." The authors indicate that empirical data
(staff ratings of the 73 whites and 76 blacks on four
exploitation categories) demonstrate that whites are
exploited more than blacks. It is in the attempt to
interpret and explain these data that problems arise.
The authors attribute to one youth leader (staff
member) in the institution the opinion that black
domination is due to blacks' greater aggressiveness
and greater group cohesion. Further, this youth
leader offers the opinion that "blacks are just
naturally more aggressive because most of the black
kids we get here are from the ghetto." He feels tiat
the willingness of blacks to stick together makes
whites fearful of retaliation if they contest black
power, and further, that victimization and injustices
suffered by blacks in the community motivate them to
retaliate against whites and to use the opportunity to
gain revenge.
Based on little more than the staff ratings and the
aforementioned opinion, the authors engage in an
elaborate discussion and explanation of these ex-
tremely sensitive and controversial topics. The dis-
cussion breaks down in a number of areas. For
example, the authors assert that, "The animosity
held against whites motivates blacks to pursue
retribution for exploitation occurring before incar-
ceration." How, except for the youth leader's opin-
ion, is this known? There seems to be no empirical
basis for this conclusion.
There is also little basis for concluding that certain
"values" such as "don't kiss ass," "don't rat on your
peers," "be cool," "don't steal," etc., are uniquely
values of the black ghetto. Do they have their
counterparts in the outside world? Certainly! But
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are they unique to a particular group or race or social
class? I don't know, although I doubt it, and I don't
think the authors know either. Why do "values"
imported into the institution by kids from the black
ghetto override other values imported from other
sources by other inmates? Again, there is no clear
basis or evidence for this conclusion.
Other examples of these same seemingly unsup-
ported conclusions concerning race and social class
are:
A lower-class white... is not as easy to victimize
as the middle-class white because of his physical and
mental toughness.
... many of the white victims come from rural
settings and are more prejudiced toward blacks than
urban whites. This prejudice, in turn, creates animos-
ity and causes retaliation from black inmates.
Social class background... sets the stage for
who becomes the victim and who becomes the aggres-
sor.
This latter conclusion is additionally subjected to a
methodological weakness in that the authors indicate
that adequate data on social class were unavailable.
Assumptions of homogeneity among race and social
class groupings seem unwarranted.
Methodological problems exist with each of three
tests used to determine whether the boys differed
psychologically. The three tests used were the Gough
Adjective Checklist, the Machover Draw-a-Figure
Test and the Jesness Personality Inventory.
The first of these, the Gough Adjective Checklist,
is a series of 24 scales consisting of 300 adjectives
used to rank either oneself or others. The authors
admit that many of the adjectives were far too
difficult for the inmate to understand. The solution of
the researchers to this problem was to define the
words when requested by the inmates. This raises
numerous questions of validity: Did the boys always
request a definition when they failed to understand
an adjective? Did boys who received definitions have
the same understanding of adjectives as boys who did
not? What is the effect of interviewer bias in giving
definitions? A further complication was the resulting
increased length of the testing period which made it
boring for the inmates. This too subjects the results
to some suspicion. One interesting finding from the
use of the Gough was that boys with "R" institu-
tional classifications (considered dangerous to him-
self or others) and "E" institutional classifications
(mentally disturbed) ranked first or second on 18 of
the 21 scales used, indicating they were the emotion-
ally healthiest of the boys. Boys without R or E
labels scored lowest, indicating they were the most
disturbed. Obviously something is wrong with either
the institutional diagnosis and classification or the
Gough, or possibly both.
The Machover Draw-a-Figure Test was given
"because it is a projective test designed to reveal
hidden propensities" regarding sexual identity, feel-
ings of inferiority, aggression, maladjustment and
anxiety. The authors indicate that the reliability of
this instrument has been challenged, but apparently
they decided to use it as an experiment. There was
considerable resistance by the Boys to taking this
particular test. In discussing the findings from the
Machover, the authors conclude that, "Considering
the vast amount of psychological literature challeng-
ing the validity of the Machover, considerable reser-
vation must be exercised before accepting any of its
findings." Although the authors are forthright in
acknowledging these problems, one is not sure
whether the Machover is unreliable, invalid or both.
Also, one would have to question the wisdom of its
use, even on an experimental basis, if these serious
problems were known beforehand.
Lastly, the Jesness Personality Inventory consists
of 155 true-false items constructed to distinguish dis-
turbed or delinquent children from normals and to
measure attitudes toward self and others. None of the
Jesness findings was statistically significant. While
apparently able to discriminate social characteristics,
according to the authors, theJesness did not discrimi-
nate personality characteristics. The authors con-
clude again that there are problems with the validity
of this test.
In sum, these tests are of doubtful appropriateness
for the population being tested, as Bartollas, Miller
and Dinitz acknowledge. Their recommendation that
future research be done to document the relationship
between personal and social characteristics in institu-
tional adjustment is well taken.
Juvenile Victimization has significant implications
for several reader audiences. For persons interested
and concerned about the juvenile justice system in
general, it offers evidence in support of separating
jdvenile delinquents who have committed criminal
offenses from those juveniles who are simply in need
of supervision. For example, one of the institutional
social role types, the "scapegoat," is described as
follows: "He normally is committed to the Ohio
Youth Commission for incorrigibility and running
away from other institutions. . . . In contrast to that
of other boys, his anxiety does not subside, princi-
pally because he realizes that he is a 'prime candi-
date' for extensive exploitation-being small, lower-
middle-class, and white." Of 25 boys definitely ex-
ploited, 16 were regarded as chronic sexual victims
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who were considered to be cottage scapegoats. Under
a JINS, PINS, etc. status, would not such youths
who are most amenable to exploitation and victimi-
zation be barred from confinement in this type of
institution?
Perhaps a larger issue is the finding that 61 per
cent of the boys were exploited at least on items such
as food, clothes, and cigarettes, "leaving only about
29 per cent who were not intimidated or forced into
a victim role at some time." Does this not have
implications for what constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment? Can juveniles, or adults for that matter,
be confined in this type of institution in a constitu-
tional manner?
Correctional administrators and treatment staff
should note the authors' conclusion that: "Resident
victimization is facilitated by the diagnostic process-
ing and labels, psychiatric and institutional, affixed
to the residents' dossiers and to them as people ...
This is a concrete illustration of the self-fulfilling
prophecy; of the effectiveness of stigma in promoting
exploitation and a pecking order within the institu-
tion." What does this imply for any form of inmate
classification system? For example, at the time of the
study, TICO was implementing the Interpersonal
Maturity Level Classification System (I-level). Will
this system also become a self-fulfilling prophecy
promoting stigma and exploitation?
For those persons who are considering working
with offenders or who are already doing so, the
chapter entitled, "Inmate Games: The Staff As
Target," should be extremely interesting and inform-
ative. Anypne who has worked in this type of
institution should find much that is familiar in this
particular discussion. How can the culture clash
which seems to occur between middle-class treatment
professionals and lower-class offenders be amelio-
rated so as to prevent the destruction, disillusionment
and cynicism of staff which impairs their perform-
ance? Can staff training resolve these kinds of
problems?
For the Ohio Youth Commission and its institu-
tional administrators, as well as for comparable
bodies and individuals elsewhere, the book provides a
valuable evaluation which can lead to change and
reform. In TICO, for example, one wonders why the
alleged influence of the black culture cannot to some
degree be minimized by such administrative rem-
edies as exercising control over the types of food
served in the institution. The authors assert that
"only a few whites feel secure and strong enough to
eat what they want," and that "blacks control the
kinds of food eaten." Why must this be so? There
are other examples of this kind occurring throughout
the book. What might be done about them?
Last and perhaps least, for Bartollas, Miller,
Dinitz, and their editors, the index of subjects is
somewhat exasperating. The index is both incom-
plete in that it does not fully cite its subjects, and
inaccurate in that some subjects cannot be found on
the pages cited. This is an unfortunate and unneces-
sary flaw. It is, however, only a minor flaw in the
otherwise valuable Juvenile Victimization: The
Institutional Paradox.
CRIME AND PRIVILEGE; TOWARD A NEW CRIMINOL-
OGY. By Barry Krisberg. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, 1975. Pp. 181. $8.95.
This recent addition to the new criminology is a
product of the Berkeley wing (Platt, Schwendinger,
Takagi), and indeed utilizes the York group in
Britain very sparingly beyond the opening obligatory
mentions. Krisberg demands a criminology which
promotes social justice, if necessary in defiance of the
powers which feed and pamper criminologists.
Indeed, he contends that criminology must play a
central role in fostering social justice, and it is hard to
argue with his point that "developing a critical
perspective in criminology is particularly crucial
because in the area of crime and crime control we
encounter myths designed to legitimate the use of
force to maintain order." So he presents a text
composed of two exhortative chapters, at beginning
and end, and three substantive chapters (Crime and
Privilege, The Struggle Inside [prison], and Control-
ling the Dangerous Classes: Punishment and Social
Structure). "The Struggle Inside" is a reprint
chapter written by other radical authors, including
Angela Davis and the younger Eldridge Cleaver.
Krisberg continually refers the reader to C.
Wright Mills and the sociological imagination, espe-
cially Mills' work on the power elite and the
professional ideology of social pathologists. It is in a
way ironic that Mills is lauded for unraveling the
hidden ideologies of [the traditional] criminologists
in the same chapter where the unsupported assertion
is advanced that "piecemeal reform efforts...
support the myth that progress and improvement can
occur without major restructuring of the social
order" (italics mine). Or consider the following:
"Describing the process of domination in a given
society is a difficult task because the available social
theory tends to dismiss the existence of privilege."
Despite such occasional intemperate lapses, Krisberg
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makes an effective case for the prominence of uncon-
scious criminological ideologies in various historical
periods. I also found his chapter on the history of
penal sanctions ["Controlling the Dangerous Classes
. . . "I both informative and intriguing. Although
the economic interpretation of penal sanctioning [a Ia
Rusche and Kirchheimer] is not wholly convincing,
Krisberg makes a strong persuasive case for the
prominence of the economic dimension in historical
penology.
One discouraging aspect appears in spite of the
quality of the presentation: Krisberg is totally pre-
dictable, over dozens of issues. Surely, one feels, he
will emerge on the conservative side on some one
issue! Here is the irritating feature of the new
criminology, brought into sharper focus by the.very
obvious intelligence of this book: it is one hundred
per cent predictable. A matter merely of logical con-
sistency? Not at all: there are just too many dis-
parate topics addressed to support the idea that a
position on one necessitates a comparable position on
specific others. There is, to those reared on crimino-
logical texts in which the author sometimes dis-
played strange idiosyncrasies, a certain lack of
judiciousness in works where one can perfectly pre-
dict the stance to be assumed at the very onset of a
new topic. But perhaps such sentiment on the re-
viewer's part merely betrays his origins in an era
that emphasized judiciousness rather than righteous
indignation.
Like all revisionist work, the new criminology
must necessarily expand its coverage beyond the
traditional boundaries. So it has been with the new
criminology in general, and so it is with Krisberg in
Crime and Privilege. At many times the book reads
more like a text in social stratification than in
criminology, "old" or "new." But he always man-
ages quite skillfully to weave a tapestry that both
hangs together in a coherent fashion and returns
again and again to the traditional subject matters of
criminology, albeit from a different vantage point.
His command of the literature, both of criminology
and of a wider sociological framework, is excellent
and clearly in evidence.
This is not to say that I agree with all, or even
most, of Krisberg's conclusions. The work is openly
didactic and polemical. To say that it hangs together
well is not to say that any entirely opposed interpre-
tation of American society and its social control
institutions would not cohere equally well. The
works cited and discussed are transparently selective,
as they have to be for Krisberg to make his
indictment. What strikes one, then, is not the
correctness of his interpretation but the certainty
that a very strong case has been made. Critics of the
new criminology must respond with equally pene-
trating analyses if their rebuttals are to be convinc-
ing.
RICHARD L. HENSHEL
University of Western Ontario
THINKING ABOUT CRIME. By James Q. Wilson.
New York: Basic Books, 1975. Pp. ix, 231. $10.00.
For years, criminologists have been developing
theories of human behavior, each intended to explain
the "crime problem." Thus far, these efforts have
proven unsatisfactory. Wilson's Thinking About
Crime ii a reaction against further theory construc-
tion and a critique of the costs and benefits involved.
Thinking About Crime is a collection of essays
concerning various forms of predatory crime-rob-
bery, burglary, larceny and auto theft; apparently,
Wilson presumes corporate, professional, organized
and political crimes are less serious-not sufficient
to warrant attention. Wilson's sole concern with
predatory crimes stems from his belief that the
"community" is the most sacred element bonding
people and neighborhoods. Wilson states:
Predatory crime does not merely victimize individu-
als, it impedes and, in the extreme case, even prevents
the formation and maintenance of community. By
disrupting the delicate nexus of ties, formal and
informal, by which we are linked with our neighbors,
crime atomizes society and makes of its members mere
individual calculators estimating their own advantage,
especially their own chances for survival amidst their
fellows....
Once demonstrating the magnitude of the preda-
tory "crime problem," Wilson's effort is toward
developing immediate action plans aimed at reducing
crime, not constructing a theory of human behavior.
In fact, throughout the book, Wilson reacts against
social scientists' efforts directed toward theory devel-
opment. Why? Because, Wilson argues, the "crime
problem" is current and something needs to be done
now. Theory construction takes years, and even then,
history has demonstrated what has been accom-
plished is minimal. Simply, efforts toward theory
development have failed because they do not deal
with the "crime problem": getting lawbreakers off
the streets. Thus, Wilson implies that present and
future rehabilitative strategies will fail. Conse-
quently, all rehabilitative efforts should be aban-
doned and society should be satisfied with
incapacitating offenders.
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Overall, Wilson asks social scientists to stop
considering the "root" causes of crime, because these
call for camouflage solutions which are not readily
available. Further, and most important for Wilson,
governmental programs cannot respond to "root"
causes, because they are subjective, not structural.
Therefore, nearly all previous efforts examining
"root" causes have actually deflected policy makers
from effective action plans. After all, governments
can only alter the "game plan" for would-be preda-
tory offenders and incapacitate them; they can do
nothing more. Research aimed at uncovering "root"
causes is therefore detrimental to reducing crime
rates.
In the book's final section, Wilson focuses on
specific structural changes needed to reduce crime;
these are not ones often found in the literature.
Wilson argues that we should not concentrate on
reforming the police, who do their job by arresting
thousands of people. Instead, attention should be
given to reworking the court system, which is loaded
with flaws and needs to be redone. As everybody
knows, arrested persons are quickly released, do not
come to trial for months, and are often returned to
society without any penalty (even after guilt has been
determined). Consequently, Wilson prescribes that
certainty of punishment be increased, so that, in an
ideal world, the court system:
1. would be organized around the primary task of
sentencing, not around the largely mythic task of
determining guilt....
2. the sentencing process would be placed under cen-
tral management, with uniform standards enforced
by a presiding officer and applied under his direc-
tion....
3. every conviction for a nontrivial offense would en-
tail a penalty that involved a deprivation of lib-
erty....
4. "Deprivation of Liberty" need not, and usually
would not, entail confinement in a conventional
prison ....
5. Conviction for a subsequent offense would invari-
ably result in an increased deprivation of lib-
erty ....
Wilson leaves no doubt regarding-his position for
lawbreakers: they should be punished, and we as a
society should not concern ourselves with rehabilita-
tion. It is through punishment that offenders are off
the streets and prevented from doing additional
damage.
Wilson's argument is sound and well composed.
He is a social scientist who possesses both skill and
influence; Thinking About Crime demonstrates that.
But his position is questionable. First, it is too early
to adopt Wilson's "lock-em up" attitude; rehabilita-
tive efforts should not be written off completely, as he
advocates. Wilson assumes that because earlier "peo-
ple-changing" efforts have failed, so will newer and
innovative techniques. Obviously, not all forms of
rehabilitation need be conceived and tried, but
Thinking About Crime asks us to "throw in the
towel." Second, Wilson implies that governments
can intimidate potential lawbreakers. This writer,
and others, disagree, arguing that it may be possible
to intimidate some prospective lawbreakers through
increasing certainty, celerity and severity of sanc-
tions, but that in the long run, these strategies will
not alter the crime rate significantly.
Overall, Thinking About Crime is worth reading.
It is a well-designed book and will challenge many
readers. It is representative of the "neo-conserva-
tism" approach and is filled with ideas that may
become a reality in the not too distant future.
ROBERT M. REGOLI
Indiana State University
THE IMPACT OF CRIME, By John E. Conklin, New
York: Macmillan, 1975. Pp. ix, 294. $4.95.
One suspects from its title and table of contents
that Conklin's effort characterizes crime as a causal
agent-a factor disrupting social organization and
precipitating social conflict. He states in the preface
that it is "an analytical study of the effects of
crime on the social structure." In this he adopts a
functionalist framework centering the analysis on
crime within singular groups or collectives. Crime is
viewed as a cause of fear and distrust and perceived
as socially divisive among community members.
Because of the fear it instills, crime reduces commu-
nication and interaction and thereby leads to a
general breakdown of important social controls.
The thrust of Conklin's argument is that crime
weakens the social fabric and, in contrast to Durk-
heim's thesis on its positive social functions, divides
and fragments communities. Whereas Durkheim
held crime unifies community members by raising
their collective conscience, Conklin maintains the
opposite is more common. From journalistic accounts
of violence in rural communities as well as surveys of
suburban and urban areas, he discovers crime is
dysfunctional. Suspicions arise; fears are provoked
and association among members is fractured. From
this and supportive evidence reported throughout the
book, Conklin infers the Dur~kheimian position is
invalid, reasoning instead that crime is harmful to
community solidarity. In drawing this inference,
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special attention is paid to reactions to crime and
how these reactions alienate community members
from one another.
Substantively, the significance of this inference is
undermined by the inadequate conceptual support
given the analysis. This stems primarily from the
cursory treatment given Durkheim's position and a
failure to elaborate on the important distinction be-
tween the effects of crime and societal responses to it.
Clearly Durkheim concluded that reactions to crime,
whether collectivistic or individualistic, mirror the
nature of social organization and are not isolated
effects of criminal behavior, as Conklin implies.
Rather, these reactions are shaped by social solidar-
ity and cannot be divorced from it. Because of this,
Conklin's starting point and inference that reactions
to crime reflect its impact on the social structure is
entirely too narrow. His neglect of social organiza-
tion-the norms and values which pattern behavior
and attitudes-as affecting these reactions leaves
open to question whether the differences he observes
in the solidarity of high-crime and low-crime areas
stem from the effects of crime or from antecedent
differences in the composition of these communities.
This is not to argue that crime has no effect on
attitudes and interaction within collectives; the
author evidences this clearly and convincingly. Yet if
we maintain crime is a social phenomenon and one of
many symptoms of disorganization or conflict, then
its effects can only be gauged from a position much
broader than Conklin's. Specifically, one must con-
sider the impact of social organization on both the
nature of crime and societal reactions to it. The
effects of crime on community reactions, at least on
the conceptual level, must be differentiated from
effects growing from inherent differences in a com-
munity's norms and values as well as those arising
from other sources. By overlooking this distinction
and identifying the fear, distrust and other reactions
precipitated by crime as its impact, Conklin loses
sight of the crucial relationship between crime, the
reactions it elicits, and community organization.
Both crime and its "impact" emanate from social
organization and not vice versa. This oversight is a
serious flaw in his analysis and by far the major
weakness of the book.
In contrast are his discussions of informal controls
on crime and public perceptions of the law. Compari-
sons are first drawn between urban and rural areas
in the degree that informal control is affected by
patterns of social relationships. Predictably, homoge-
neous communities with intense social interaction are
found to have strong informal control over their
members and thus to have very little crime. This
evident concern for the role of community organiza-
tion is further elaborated in an analysis of commu-
nity perceptions of law. Although we question his
operationalization of support for the law (the wil-
lingness to report crimes to the police may only
reflect the ulterior motives of those who report them),
Conklin's interpretation of findings clearly stresses
the potential effects of community norms on mem-
bers' attitudes. Important emphasis is given the im-
pact of social organization (i.e., the lower-class cul-
ture posited by Walter Miller) on perceptions of
crime and law. Conklin states that subcultural norms
and values "can reduce support for the law at the
same time [they increase] the actual and perceived
amounts of crime in the community." Hence, Conk-
lin demonstrates a clear recognition of the effects of
social structure on behavior and attitudes and thus on
community reactions to crime. Regrettably, this
recognition is not evident in his earlier treatment of
Durkheim.
Apart from this substantive problem are some
weaknesses in the presentation of quantitative results
that should be noted. Beyond the standard hazards
involved in using low correlations and small samples,
no measures of variation are provided for the reader
to assess the effects of these hazards on reported
results. This style of presentation precludes any
empirical challenge to the author's inferences and
technique and thereby handicaps the reader inter-
ested in a deeper empirical inquiry. Furthermore, we
often found the interpretations of results equivocal
and unfounded. For example, survey results in an
important assessment of the salience of crime are
ambivalently described as "not affected very much by
the personal characteristics of the respondents." We
should note that the magnitude of this effect is
examined in a scant and superficial manner.
A similar example of this haphazardness appears
in the same chapter, where Conklin incorrectly infers
that "crime prbduces insecurity, distrust, and a
negative view of the community." Forgetting that
only indirect measures of crime were employed
(group perceptions of its salience), he makes an
empirically unfounded leap in substituting crime as a
determinant of community sentimerts. Moreover,
the possibility is left unexamined that the attitudinal
data from which this inference is drawn may only
reflect the very apparent differences in the demo-
graphic and attitudinal composition of the areas
studied.
These weaknesses in the organization of Professor
Conklin's work suggest it is not the analytical study
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he promises in the preface. It is instead a rough
outline of some of the issues and research surround-
ing the important relationship between crime and
community organization. Although his discussions of
the costs of crime, the types of reactions it has elicited
historically (vigilante groups, civilian police patrols,
etc.) and his repetitious accounts of the Kitty Geno-
vese homicide in New York are colorful as well as
informative, the effort adds little to our understand-
ing of the social functions and dysfunctions of crime.
There is a noticeable absence of the theoretical and
empirical rigor these important subjects demand.
GEORGE BRIDGES
University of Pennsylvania
WOMEN AND CRIME. By Rita James Simon. Lexing-
ton, Massachusetts: D. C. Heath and Company,
1975. Pp. xvi, 126. $12.50.
Women and Crime is the best of the few recent
works which examine patterns and trends in female
crime and the processing of female offenders through
the criminal justice system. Its strength lies in the
systematic empirical analyses of a number of types of
data: arrest, conviction, sentence and parole data
over the past twenty years in the United States;
criminal statistics on the British case; interviews
with criminal trial court judges and prosecuting
attorneys; and comparative arrest data for twenty-
five countries. Surprisingly, these divergent data
sources point to similar conclusions which tend to
contradict recent media and pop-criminological as-
sertions that first, women's "liberation" has created
increases in female crime rates and new female
criminals who are equally adept at committing
property crimes and acts of violence, and second,
sexist justice prevails and is most detrimental to
women. Both assertions receive little empirical sup-
port, the former even less than the latter.
Analyses of UCR arrest data show that women are
still typically nonviolent, petty property offenders.
For example, the "proportion of female arrests for
violent crimes has changed hardly at all over the
past two decades," and the real rate increases in
female property offenses are primarily in larceny
(e.g., shoplifting) and secondarily in fraud (e.g.,
"bad checks" and embezzlement) and in forgery
(e.g., "naive" check forgery). These are either tradi-
tionally "female" offenses which have been tied to
the consumption role of women as houseworkers or
offenses which reflect the increased opportunity
among women to engage in occupational or white
collar crime.
Court, prison, and parole data indicate that the
"eyes of justice are neither blinded nor fully
opened," but sometimes wink in favor of women. For
example, "although one in 6.5 arrests are women,
and one in nine convictions are women, only about
one in thirty of those sentenced to prison are women.
These ratios have not changed drastically over the
past two decades, even though these years have seen a
women's movement develop and expand, and an in-
crease in the proportion of women working full time
outside their homes." This suggests that women are
ostensibly the benefactors of sexist justice, but it
denies equal protection to women and men and does
create situations where women are punished more
severely and denied resources simply because they
are women.
The book can be divided roughly into four sec-
tions, the first of which focuses on the criminal,
political, and social statuses of women. The first
chapter is a review of the theoretical and research
literature on female crime, emphasizing its paucity,
disarray and inadequacy. The other two chapters in
this section address the history and goals of the
women's movement and the current status of women
in the labor market. The second section is the
analytical core of the book. Each of its four chapters
presents a statistical analysis of a different stage in
the criminal justice process-the police, courts,
prisons, and parole. The next section consists of a
chapter which reviews British criminal statistics on
female crime as a comparison case. And the last
section contains a summary and concluding chapter,
which includes an assessment of female criminality
by criminal trial court judges and prosecuting attor-
neys. The book also includes an appendix on
international comparative arrest data, a short but
comprehensive bibliography of recent works on
women and crime, and fifty-one tables.
Women and Crime is an excellent book. For such
a short book, it is a surprisingly comprehensive
treatment of a difficult topic. It is well-written, free of
excess ideological baggage, and a work which is
already the handbook on women and crime.
JOSEPH G. WEIS
University of Washington
JAILS: THE ULTIMATE GHETTO. By Ronald Goldfarb.
Garden City: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1975. Pp.
x, 470. $9.95.
Jails: The Ultimate Ghetto closes with a blueprint
for restructuring the jails of America. Our jails,
which hold both those sentenced for short terms and
those who lack the resourcs to make bail, are places
for punishment-Goldfarb thinks it cruel and un-
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usual punishment-for innocent and guilty alike.
Typically jail inmates are poor, uneducated, of a mi-
nority group, possess both physical and psychologi-
cal problems, and have, of course, failed at coping
with the system.
I Crowded as our jails are, we ask them to return
inmates to the street no worse than they found them.
Goldfarb has no trouble establishing that we do not
do so. He documents, at times with considerable
passion (and too frequent digressions), the multiple
shortcomings, the horrors, and ultimately the unten-
able position of the jail as presently constituted. His
view is best reported in his own words:
My argument on this point proceeds, along the
following lines. It is generally agreed that physically
hurting or beating a prisoner with a blackjack-would
be a form of cruel and unusual punishment that would
not be tolerated. Indeed, most states have outlawed
corporal punishment of any kind. Yet in jails, where
theoretically men are not sent for punishment of any
kind but rather to await trial, we regularly are
subjecting inmates to subtle but equally damaging
forms of punishment which also should be considered
constitutionally impermissible.
So little researched material is available on the jail
and its place in the system that this book must be
considered a very welcome addition to the crimino-
logical literature, although lacking in theoretical
sophistication.
Over half of the book focuses on specific types of
problem people found in jail-the physically and
mentally sick, the narcotic addict, the alcholic, and
the juvenile. In these chapters, Goldfarb's rhetoric
diminishes and is replaced by abundant, documented
detail. It should be noted that although the book was
published in 1975, there are no references after 1973.
Some of the examples used to illustrate points may
therefore no longer obtain, but, in general, the
situation has not changed.
Goldfarb, who is an attorney in the criminal
justice system, is not content to leave the reader with
fact finding and instead, at the end, formulates a
detailed, action-oriented design for restructuring the
jail. The plan which aligns structure to function
deserves careful analysis and review by corrections
administrators and policy level public officials. Gold-
farb closes by calling for public scrutiny by all
groups, such as his own profession, which have either
access to jails or the resources to bring about change.
The obligation ought to extend to all citizens-social
scientist, community interest groups, the press, poli-
tician and practitioner. This book is a beginning.
BARBARA R. PRICE
The Pennsylvania State University
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN DRUNK DRIVING
CASES. By . W. Little. University of Florida
Social Sciences Monograph No. 53. The, Uni-
versity Presses of Florida, Gainesville, 197S. Pp.
226. $6.50.
The forward describes in sometimes poetic terms
the subject of the report to follow. The subject?
Vermont and life in Vermont. The forward would
have been appropriate for almost any book promot-
ing the virtues of the Green Mountain State, whether
it be farming, quarrying or tourism. It is also
appropriate for this book, which describes in detail
the administration of justice in drunk driving cases in
Vermont.
The present reviewer, having had more than the
usual exposure to a number of state judicial systems,
including that of Vermont, appreciates the candor of
the author in describing the "softness" of the data.
Such candor bestows credibility on the book.
It is divided into five chapters and is well orga-
nized. Beginning with a description of the system, it
progresses to a series of empirical studies of the ac-
tual operation of the system and then to the human
factors that affect that operation. The book concludes
with a commentary discussing a number of the
weaknesses and suggested ways to strengthen the
program.
The report is concluded with the statement that,
"Justice can be improved in Vermont and elsewhere
by making changes in laws and procedures. The
effectiveness of the system may be slightly enhanced.
also. But fundamental changes in death and crash
rates will await fundamental changes in the underly-
ing pervasive social realities, including, importantly,
public knowledge and attitudes."
The limitation of this book is also its strength. It is
provincial; its immediate usefulness is limited to the
State of Vermont. For anyone needing to understand
or to work with the judicial system in Vermont, this
is required reading. Its strength is that it is a model
that should be emulated by other states. It is only




EVALUATING TREATMENT ENVIRONMENTS. 1974,
Pp. 388, and EVALUATING CORRECTIONAL AND
COMMUNITY SETTINGS. 1975, Pp. 377. By Rudolf
H. Moos. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
$15.00 & $15.95.
The main goal of Evaluating Treatment Environ-
ments is to develop techniques for the systematic
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characterization of human environments. Most of
this book focuses on the development of perceived
climate scales for hospital-based and community-
based treatment programs. The research procedure
includes both a "subjective" perceptions methodol-
ogy and an "objective" ecological methodology.
Social ecology is defined as the multi-disciplinary
study of the impact of physical and social environ-
ments on human beings. The emphasis is on the
measurement of objective and physical characteristics
of environments and the evolutionary adaptive conse-
quences of these environments.
Moos identifies six types of dimensions to consider
when relating characteristics of an environment to
human functioning: (1) ecological dimensions; (2)
dimensions of behavior settings; (3) dimensions of
organizational structure; (4) dimensions identifying
the collective, personal and/or behavioral character-
istics of the milieu inhabitants; (5) dimensions
related to psychosocial characteristics and organiza-
tional climates; and (6) variables relevant to the
functional or reinforcement analysis of environments.
Each of these dimensions has a decisive and impor-
tant impact on individual and group behavior.
There are three basic dimensions that characterize
and discriminate among subunits within different
kinds of environments: (1) relationship; (2) personal
development; and (3) system maintenance and sys-
tem change. Relationship dimensions identify the
nature and intensity of personal relationships in an
environment. Personal development dimensions as-
sess the basic directions for personal growth and self-
enhancement within an environment. System main-
tenance and system change dimensions focus on the
extent to which an environment: (1) is orderly; (2) is
clear in its expectations; (3) maintains control; and
(4) is responsive to change.
Based on the six types of environemental dimen-
sions, the author provides guidelines for compiling
program descriptions, and he proposes a framework
for guiding future research which includes the vari-
ous instruments which should be used to measure the
three dimensions of organizational climate (i.e.,
relationship, personal development, and system
maintenance and system change).
In analyzing the relationship between treatment
environment and treatment outcome, Moos utilizes
three indicators of treatment outcome: (1) drop-out
rate; (2) release rate; and (3) community tenure rate.
Drop-out rate is the number of patients in each
program who were formally discharged against
medical advice. Release rate is the number of patients
released from each program divided by the overall
patient number. Community tenure rate is the per-
centage of patients released from a given program
who are still in the community at the end of a stipu-
lated period.
A multitude of significant research findings are
presented in this book. A sample of the findings is as
follows: (1) negative perceptions and deviant re-
sponses may be due to the lack of information about a
new milieu, therefore, systematic information about
a new milieu may help to socialize an individual and
increase the probability of positive outcomes; (2)
environmental and stimulus variables may reduce
and shape the potential variability of human behav-
ior; and (3) the common assumption that adjustment
in the treatment milieu is highly related to adjust-
ment in the community is not correct because this
research found that the patient's behavior in treat-
ment settings differs remarkably from the behavior in
"out of hospital" settings.
This book provides an in-depth look at the
complexities of evaluation research. It is a significant
contribution to the social sciences because it develops
innovative measurement instruments for evaluating
treatment strategies. Of equal importance is the
implementation of these measurement instruments in
treatment environments, and the deliberate inter-
pretation of research findings. Moos' concern for
research rigor is exemplary. However, the book is
"geared" for sophisticated methodologists who have
a basic understanding of treatment environments and
for this reason, it is not appropriate reading for the
lay practitioner. A systematic summary of the vari-
ous research findings would have made this book
more useful to the practitioner who is a research
novice.
This book is not recommended to novices in
research, but it is recommended to individuals who
are actively involved in evaluation research. Evaluat-
ing Treatment Environments may have utility as a
supplement in an advanced research methods course
or in an evaluation research course.
The second book, Evaluating Correctional and
Community Settings, focuses on evaluating the social
environments of correctional programs (both institu-
tional and community-based), families, and military
companies. The goal is to relate both perceptual
measures and objective measures of correctional
programs to different types of adaptation in these
settings.
This research utilizes a similar methodology to
that used in Evaluating Treatment Environments.
Moos developed social climate scales to measure the
characteristics of social environments by asking the
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individual participant about the characteristics of the
environment. For example, he constructed the Cor-
rectional Institutions Environment Scale (CIES) in
order to assess nine dimensions of the social climate
of correctional programs. This scale measures the
impact of correctional programs on resident morale,
modes of adaptation, and coping; and it assesses the
interaction between program, staff and residents. A
similar methodology is applied to the evaluation of
community-based correctional programs, families
and military companies. This research methodology
is applicable to a wide variety of social environments
and it includes guidelines for changing environments
in desired directions.
This study found that people are more satisfied
and perform better when their relationship dimen-
sions are emphasized and when the environment
focuses upon personal growth dimensions. Although
students learn more in classrooms that emphasize
competition and difficulty, they are also absent more
often. College students learn more when the empha-
sis is on independent study, high standards, criticism
and breadth of interest. Hospital patients do better in
treatment programs that emphasize economy and
practical orientations.
Order and clarity of the social environment have
an impact on satisfaction, moods and performance of
system participants. Although control can have a
negative impact, this will depend on the rigidity of
the control and the developmental maturity of the
individuls involved. People actively select and create
their own environment, and environments also ac-
tively select their own people. In most cases, people
do not have adequate power to change their environ-
mental conditions which other people have created
(e.g., young people, teenagers, minorities, and
inmates). Moos includes a quote from Winston
Churchill to illustrate this point: "We shape our
buildings, and afterwards, our buildings shape us."
People vary their behavior in social environments,
therefore, researchers must include environmental
and social setting variables in their analysis of human
behavior.
This book provides an in-depth view of evaluation
methodology and evaluation research finding (due to
space limitations, many of the findings were not
discussed here). The findings of this research have
practical implications for a variety of correctional
programs; therefore, this book has some utility in an
advanced corrections course. It may also have value
in a research methods course or an evaluation
research course in that Moos stresses accurate mea-
surement of concepts and innovative strategies for
evaluating treatment programs. However, this book
assumes an elementary knowledge of the research
process, and it is not appropriate reading for the
research novice.
Although different treatment environments are
evaluated, this book is somewhat repetitive of Evalu-
ating Treatment Environments. It utilizes a similar
rationale and methodology, and -it illustrates the
methodology in much the same manner. Therefore,
many of the comments in the first review are
applicable.
The material contained within this book is an
excellent supplement to Evaluating Treatment Envi-
ronments. In fact, it may have been more appropriate
to include both books in one volume, thereby mini-
mizing repetition. In addition, these books would
have been more beneficial if they had included a step-




Reviewers have a right to their opinions, however
nonsensical (from the author's viewpoint). I respect
that right-which Jack P. Gibbs fully uses in his
review (June 1976) of my Punishing Criminals.
Gibbs has chosen to review my Punishing Criminals
as a deviation from his own (sui generis meritorious)
Crime, Punishment and Deterrence. Fine. But he
also has torn quotations from Punishing Criminals
out of context. That goes beyond reviewer's license,
even in my latitudinarian view of it, and does re-
quire the following corrections:
(1) Gibbs quotes "Retribution is to restore an
objective order rather than to satisfy a subjective
craving for revenge .... " He does not tell the reader
that I am doing no more here than explaining the
origin of the scales usually found in the hands of
statues of justice. On the contrary, he suggests that I
present what I explicitly explain as a "visual
metaphor" of historical interest as my theory
advocating capital punishment (advocated 16 chap-
ters later on quite different grounds).
(2) Gibbs suggests that "some of [my] statements
about order may traumatize the tender minded"
because I write: "order necessitates a punishment far
above what justice would countenance." Gibbs does
not tell that I am here explicitly analyzing Adam
Smith's illustration of the conflict between order and
justice: a penalty such as shooting a sentry who fell
asleep may be required even though unjust, i.e., too
severe for a trivial act not intended to do the harm it
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might do. Unbeknownst to Gibbs' readers, but not to
Gibbs, I was paraphrasing Smith's illustration.
Actually, in my opinion, order may require more or
less severe punishment than justice, and is discussed
by me as an independent variable.
(3) Gibbs quotes my "conduct prohibited by law is
wrong" suggesting that I am making an ethical or
political (rather than a legal) statement, which he
finds "difficult to accept." He quoted the first
sentence of a section headed "Two Kinds of Wrong,"
which analyzes the distinction between malum in se
and malum prohibitum, and in no way suggests that
what the law prohibits is always (independently or
morally or politically) wrong. I was acquainting my
readers with the legal notion of wrong, with which
Gibbs is surely familiar.
(4) Gibbs has me "committed to the principle" he
quotes "that the law differentiate among offenders
only in terms of their offenses." My phrase begins:
"Justice requires" and I was distinguishing its re-
quirements from those of deterrence, charity, etc.
Thus, Gibbs' objection that the principle "is scarcely
a basis for promoting deterrence" is beside the point.
Deterrence is discussed as a separate principle. I may
not have solved the compounding problem to Gibbs'
liking. But any reader of my book will know that I
did not ignore it, or reduce punishment to either
justice or deterrence, as Gibbs suggests.
(5) Elsewhere Gibbs notes that an exclusively
deterrence-based punishment would "justify or be
conducive to the punishment of the innocent" and
wonders why I "pay so little attention to [this]
primary ethical objection to the deterrence doctrine."
Actually, I insist on the retributive (justice) element
in punishment as necessary precisely because a
purely deterrence (rehabilitation) based punishment
has no more moral dimension than the treatment of
disease does. Guilt becomes irrelevant. Only prob-
lems of prevention and cure remain, and these are
neither just nor unjust, only effective or ineffective.
Wherefore I wrote: "deterrent effects are hoped for.
But they are neither necessary nor sufficient for
punishment. Only a crime is. Yet once a person is
guilty of crime, society is entitled to make his punish-
ment deterrent, because by committing the crime, the
offender voluntarily risked not less." Gibbs calls me
a retributionist-which I am, inter alia-and then
accuses me of omitting just the elements that I ex-
plicitly present to justify my retributionism.
(6) Gibbs also notes that I indicate that the relative
severity of punishments cannot be morally justified in
cardinal terms, nor the gravity of crimes cardinally
measured. But Gibbs ignores what I point out: that
an ordinal coordination of crimes and punishments is
possible and sufficient. He uses my statement and his
omission to deny that one can meaningfully require
(as I do) that the guilty be punished in proportion to
desert, to the gravity of their crimes. This require-
ment has to be compounded with the demands of
charity and of social order (deterrence). Thus Gibbs
contends that a retributionist (justice) view cannot
consistently include a deterrence view. My book
explains why it can and must. I may be wrong. But
Gibbs unfairly distorts my view to make it a
convenient target for his objections to exclusively
retribution or exclusively deterrence-based punish-
ments.
(7) Gibbs also reproaches me for paying "scant
attention" to "specific deterrence." I defined "deter-
rence" as the expected restraining effects of the
credible threat of punishment on others than the one
punished. I called the hoped-for effects on the person
punished "incapacitation" or, upon release, "reha-
bilitation." Since I define "rehabilitation" as the
decrease in the frequency of the released offender's
unlawful conduct, whether brought about by
intimidation or by changes in character, it describes
what Gibbs calls "specific deterrence," a term I
reject as confusing and duplicative. Gibbs writes "the
alternative to rehabilitation programs is a penal pol-
icy that promotes specific deterrence... " as though
specific deterrence could be distinguished from reha-
bilitation operationally defined. His terminology
must have confused him. I don't think he should
reproach me for not having shared his confusion. Far
from paying scant attention, I discuss rehabilitation
at length.
Since he regards my attempts to define it so far as
insufficient, let me add this ostensive definition:
justice is what Gibbs has not done to Punishing
Criminals.
ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG
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